The Risk Didn’t Disappear. It Just Changed Hands

 

A bank can transfer the risk of billions in loans without actually selling those loans. The customers remain, the contracts remain, and the bank continues collecting payments. But somewhere else in the financial system, another institution has agreed to absorb part of the potential losses.

This is not a loophole. It is a financial mechanism known as Synthetic Risk Transfer (SRT), and its growing use raises a question that deserves more attention: what happens when the institutions taking the risk are connected to the very banks transferring it?

The loan stays. The risk moves.

In a typical SRT transaction, a bank selects a portfolio of loans and purchases protection against potential defaults. An investment fund or another institution provides that protection, often through a financial guarantee or credit-linked note.

In return, the bank receives regulatory capital relief, provided the transaction meets supervisory requirements.

The arrangement has a clear economic purpose. Banks can manage their capital more efficiently without selling loans or abandoning their relationships with borrowers.

The market has expanded considerably. According to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), annual SRT issuance increased fivefold between 2016 and 2024. By the end of 2024, nearly €800 billion in underlying loans were covered by outstanding transactions.

But this figure does not mean €800 billion in losses were transferred. It represents the loan portfolios receiving protection, often against losses in only specific portions of those portfolios.

The connection nobody sees on the balance sheet

Here is where the structure becomes more interesting.

Imagine an investment fund purchases protection on a bank’s loan portfolio. To finance that investment, the fund borrows money from another bank, using its financial assets as collateral.

The original bank has transferred part of its credit risk. Yet another bank may now have an exposure to the fund holding that risk.

If the underlying borrowers begin defaulting, the fund could face losses. Its ability to meet its financial obligations may weaken, potentially affecting the bank that financed it.

The BIS has identified this structure as a potential example of “circles of risk.”

There is another complication. In some transactions, the loans being protected may involve companies that the investment fund itself owns or finances. Risk can therefore become connected through several different financial relationships.

This does not mean every SRT transaction creates a dangerous loop. The BIS considers these risks modest at present and notes that financing arrangements often include substantial collateral protections.

The real uncertainty is what happens under pressure

Modern financial regulations are considerably stronger than those that existed before the 2008 financial crisis. SRTs are subject to supervisory requirements, and many transactions are backed by financial collateral.

However, the BIS identifies a persistent weakness: fragmented information about who owns the risk, who finances those investors, and how exposures connect across borders.

The market has also not yet experienced a prolonged credit downturn that would fully test these structures.

A question remains.

If banks, investment funds and other financial institutions are increasingly connected through layers of transferred credit risk, would a serious wave of defaults remain contained within the institutions that originally agreed to absorb the losses?

Or would the risk find its way back through a completely different financial door?

Sometimes the most important part of a financial transaction is not what leaves a balance sheet, but what remains connected to it.